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Abstract
We present our experience with the development of an XML-based configuration model for an Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) dedicated to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used in voice over IP signaling. 
In previous works [AL-IM09, AL-NOMS10] we have presented the SecSIP framework, a prevention system 
for SIP-based networks, which adopts a rule-based approach for specifying preventions on SIP protocol 
activities to stop attacks exploiting known vulnerability before reaching their targets. The SecSIP framework 
relies  on a  proprietary  language called  VeTo to  express  the  prevention  rules.  SecSIP uses  a  plain  text 
configuration  file  in  which  specifications  are  authored  and  managed  manually.  While  extending  the 
deployment of the framework beyond our own lab, support for remote configuration was required. Given the 
promise of Netconf, we naturally turned our investigations towards this protocol and embraced the YANG 
data-modeling  framework.  In  this  paper  we  present  the  modeling  result  on  the  SecSIP configuration 
interface and share our experience with both YANG and Netconf.
The first part of the paper is dedicated to the description of the data to be modeled, namely VeTo policies.  
The second part presents the Yang model built for VeTo policies and the Netconf framework put in place. 
Lessons learned during both modeling and coding phases are presented in a third part of the presentation. 
Finally some conclusions are given and future work is outlined.
The objective of the SecSIP framework is to defend SIP-based services against exploitation of known 
vulnerabilities. SecSIP provides a proactive point of defence between a SIP-based network of devices  
(servers,  proxies,  user  agents)  and  the  open  Internet.  There,  the  entire  SIP  traffic  between  the 
enterprise  network  and  the  outside  world  is  inspected  and  analyzed  against  authored  VeTo 
specifications before it is forwarded. When initializing, the SecSIP runtime starts loading and parsing 
authored VeTo blocks to identify different variables, event patterns, operations and actions from each 
rule. It implements an input and output layer, to capture, inject, send and receive SIP packets from  
and  to  the  network.  Intercepted  packets  are  moved  to  the  SIP  Packet  parser  module.  The  main 
function of this module is to extract different fields within a SIP message and trigger events specified 
in the definition blocks. During each execution started by the arrival of a SIP message, the SecSIP  
runtime uses a data flow acyclic graph to identify input matching rules and triggers their respective  
events. The paired events in each operator node are propagated over the graph until  a pattern is 
satisfied. When the pattern is satisfied, the respective rule is fired and the set of actions is executed. 
SecSIP offers a CLI access to its configuration. To ease the remote configuration of SecSIP boxes, we  
designed both a YANG model and the corresponding support in a Netconf agent. 
Let’s start with a brief overview of the VeTo language syntax and semantics. The language relies on an 
event-driven and rule-based approach to specify in a flexible and a scalable manner, prevention rules from 
existing vulnerabilities within a SIP network. The language combines context, definitions and events blocks 
extracted from the properties of vulerabilities to provide the ability to prevent against its exploitation. The 
context block exhibits the vulnerability surrounding environment properties. The definition block provides 
the  vulnerability  related  assumptions  on  its  behaviour  such  as  the  involved  SIP  messages  and  their 
respective fields. 
The prevention block describes the vulnerable behaviour within its context and includes a response action. 
We have shown through real vulnerabilities and exploit code deployed the usage and efficiency of VeTo 
specifications to protect different deployed SIP devices on a target testbed. These blocks are linked since the 
protection block relies on the definition and context blocks to describe a protection. Each vulnerability is 
specified using a single prevention block containing event patterns based rules to describe a vulnerable 
behaviour of SIP activity. Each rule header contains the event pattern and its body contains a set of actions  
to be applied when the pattern is satisfied. These rules may also reference collection variables that contain a  
specific message field values collected from different observed SIP messages. The variables values are kept 
in memory during an active SIP dialog. The different variables and events used by a prevention block are 
defined  in  one  or  many definition  blocks.  Using  these  different  block types  we  are  able  to  specify  a 
vulnerability exploitation behaviour and its countermeasure when it is detected in a SIP activity. 
In this tiny slide, we present an example of a VeTo specification to prevent the exploit of a vulnerability 
target  a  SIP-based hardphone.  The vulnerability  exploitation here  consists  in  sending to  the SIP phone 
multiple SIP messages of type OPTIONS with the same value of the cseq field. This leads to a crash of the 
phone.  
As mentioned in the previous slide, we describe a vulnerability using at least three blocks. The first block is 
the context where we specify the target identifiers, mainly the transport protocol used to carry SIP messages 
to the device and the IP address listening port tuple. Herein, we used two definition blocks. The first block 
defines  an  event  ev_Options when  a  SIP message  is  of  type  OPTIONS.  The  second  block  defines  a 
collection of  values  of  types set  which  contains  the values  of  the SIP field  cseq.  Finally,  we define a 
prevention block called  Bad_Cseq.  This block is attached to the context block LINKSYS962 and uses the 
two definition blocks  Options_Defs and  Cseq_Def. The block defines two rules. The first rule drops the 
message when an  ev_options event is observed for which the collection list contains already the current 
value of the cseq field. The second rule stores the current value of the cseq field of a SIP message of type 
OPTIONS.  When the SecSIP engine loads these blocks, it will start to parse and execute them against the  
observed SIP network towards the networked devices.
In the previous slide, we showed how to author a set of VeTo rules to specify a vulnerability prevention. 
When these rules are loaded by the SecSIP runtime, it starts executing those rules against the observed SIP 
traffic. These rules may contain different variables to be instantiated for each active SIP dialog. The most 
interesting feature in the SecSIP engine is to efficiently compute event patterns against SIP messages. We 
use a graph based matching approach to match the defined patterns within the different authored prevention 
blocks. SecSIP uses a global graph to track observed events.
The graph is built sequentially. Each time a rule is parsed and a node has to be inserted, SecSIP first checks  
if a similar node exists in the graph. If such node exists with the same parameters and the same parents it is 
simply reused. 
This graph is a merge of the different event patterns defined by the different VeTo blocks. Each root node in 
the graph represents an event. Intermediate nodes represent the composition of these events as described by 
the event patterns. Finally, the leaf nodes are the actions to be done when a specific pattern is satisfied. 
Links between nodes are labeled to denote the position of the event within a pattern (a left or right first  
event). When an event is observed, a token is placed in its nodes. Then, this token starts to travel within the  
graph until it reaches a leaf node where an action has to be executed.  
To author VeTo specifications,  we developed a web-based manager.  The manager  is  a  Java script  web 
application  and  it  is  served  by  SecSIP using  a  nanohttp  library.  It  is  built  using  the  JavaScriptMVC 
framework, which provides an infrastructure that uses the model-view-controller design pattern. It relies on 
a XML Schema to express and verify the grammar used to create and edit configurations. The manager 
communicates with SecSIP using SOAP. We have build different models to represent the information that 
the  manager  works  with.  The  Config  model  handles  communications  with  SecSIP,  and  deals  with 
configurations  as  a  whole.  It  has  methods  to  get  and  send  a  configuration  to  SecSIP,  and  copy  a 
configuration  onto  another  one.  The  Rule  Element  model  represents  a  part  of  a  configuration.  In  the 
manager, the representation of a configuration is similar to an XML tree: it has a Rule Element at its root, 
and this Rule Element can contain attributes, a text value, and other Rule Elements. Finally, the Constraint 
model represents all constraints that have been expressed in the XML Schema. It checks that mandatory 
children and attributes of Rule Elements are there and in the correct order, that no alien elements are present,  
and it can also test reference and uniqueness constraints that can be present in XML Schemas. To render  
those models to the user, a couple of views have been created, and for each view, a controller has been 
added, that interacts with the models. The Config view and controller consist of the menu bar at the top of 
the manager window, and link each button in the menu to one of the methods defined in the Config model  
(new  config,  get,  send,  copy  config).  The  Root  Element  view  and  controllers  are  used  to  display 
configuration inconsistencies and errors detected by constraint that  are defined at  the root  of the XML 
Schema, or that span over multiple  VeTo blocks.  The Tree view and controller  are used to render  and 
interact with the list of VeTo blocks that appears at the left of the manager window. The main function of 
this list is to allow the user to select individual blocks to view and edit them, and it also allows creating new 
blocks,  and to delete and reorder  existing blocks. Finally,  the Element view and controller  are  used to 
display and interact with Rule Elements, which represent the actual content of the configuration. 
The architecture of our standardized configuration management is made of three distributed parts: the User 
GUI, the Manager and the Device. We use the IETF standardized approach to configuration management 
with the NETCONF [RFC4741] protocol and its data modeling language called YANG [YANG].
The graphical user interface allows to establish an HTTPS connection with the Manager in order to handle 
configuration data that are modeled with YANG [Nat-NOMS10]. This interface shows the YANG data tree 
that reflects current configuration data values of the Device.
In the Manager, the HTTPS server acts as a proxy to access devices with the NETCONF protocol and save 
to a database of YANG data models (called modules).
The NETCONF server is embedded with the Device and its configuration data is XML formatted. The VeTo 
engine uses these data as definitions and protection rules.  Configuration data  are modeled by a  YANG 
module that  must  be  known by the  YANG modules  database  of  the Manager  in  order  to  match  XML 
configuration data conveyed by NETCONF with YANG data models.
The open source applications YencaP and YencaP Manager implement both NETCONF server and client 
side [YENCAP]. The Manager has to connect to a NETCONF server on the behalf of the user and has to 
retrieve which YANG modules are implemented in the Device. The Manager is then enable to look for these  
modules in its database and to build a java applet that will  be returned to the user GUI. After that, all  
requests from the User GUI are conveyed in a HTTPS request that contain NETCONF operation and the  
Manager has to replace HTTPS headers by NETCONF headers and to send the request to the NETCONF 
server. The response is processed in the opposite way.
VeTo rules are modeled within one YANG module. This listing shows a subset of the full YANG module. 
YANG allows the definition of type with the typedef statements (lines 1-11) and we use this to model some 
parameters of VeTo. For example the vtTerm definition models the selection of SIP fields with a string 
following the regular expression given in the pattern statement (lines 3 and 4). The next statement models  
any VeTo definition block (lines 12-25) with a list where each line contains the values of the when operator 
and pattern used to trigger one action. As action could be of several natures like an event or the creation of a 
collection, we model the action by a choice statement with one case by possible action. Here are the action 
of sending an event (line 19) and the action of creating a collection (line 20-22) with a name and a type.
The second list (from the line 26 to the end) models any VeTo prevention rules. The part we show here 
focuses on the relationship between preventions rules and definitions. The leaf-list statement (lines 29-31) 
models the use of definitions by the rule. A leaf-list is a list of several value of the same type and the leafref  
type is for referencing data in the YANG data tree. The path statement (line 30) gives a relative path to all  
definition names and so ensures that a protection rule uses only existing definitions. It is the same for the 
leaf event (lines 32-34) because we need to ensure that the event of this rule is defined in one of the used  
definitions. The path statement (line 33) specifies that there is one definition whose name is in the leaf-list 
uses. It is worth noting the relative notation in the Xpath expression and the use of predicate.
Finally we model protection actions with a list of actions (lines 36-53) that can be conditional, where we 
specify that a condition can be expressed on constant or already defined collection (lines 42-45). The action 
can simply be a rejection (line 48) or to store in an existing collection (same Xpath expression lines 50-51). 
The YANG graphical user interface is implemented as a java applet running on the user manager station 
(User GUI in previous figure). The left part is the YANG data model and the right part is the YANG data  
tree of selected parts in the model.
The data model visualization is a tree model that trivially fits itself to the schema tree of YANG models. Any  
YANG modules have the same virtual root called “Yang Specification” and modules can be browsed with 
simple mouse action. Icon faces are related to YANG statements, as a box for a container or a “?” for a  
choice.
The right part is also a tree but of configuration data values. One can note that only data values (called  
YANG data tree) are displayed and there is no choice and case statements in this view.  The view shows two 
instances of each list “definitions” and “protections”. 
This same view is used to create new value, as for example a new line or to update existing values. Syntax  
checking could be made before sending the request. The applet can also check some semantic constraints 
like the Xpath expressions in the path YANG statements but only on data currently displayed. This version 
is  more  a  light  management  client  and cannot  locally  manage a whole configuration.  Such global  tree 
constraints checking should be done at the server side and this is an ongoing work.
As  configuration  data  could  be  huge,  we  also  plan  to  replace  this  simple  tree  based  view  by  more 
sophisticated graph representations that are available for web-based interfaces.
Although, in this work, SecSIP serves as a concrete case study for an IPS tool dedicated to SIP protocol, it is  
like a majority of networking tools (Snort, Bro, Prelude) which rely on proprietary languages to specify the  
preventions against attack exploits. These specifications are usually authored in their respective language in 
a plain text file updated by the user or an administrator. Maintaining these specifications becomes quickly 
tedious and error prone when the number of specifications becomes important. Therefore, in this work, we 
have shown the use of standard configuration data models like XML schema and YANG to represent these 
prevention specifications.  The success of  this  approach depends on the complexity of  the  specification 
language to be translated into an XML-based modeling language. Using such language allows us to support 
web based management tools. 
In our approach, we used the following steps: first, we translated VeTo specifications to an XML-schema. 
Secondly, from this XML schema we deduced a YANG data model that can be used by the NETCONF 
protocol. When developing the YANG model, we found that we could directly model VeTo specifications to 
a YANG data model without going through an XML schema step. Therefore, YANG seems to be a good 
candidate to model complex configuration data like VeTo specifications. 
In this work, we have described a configuration management data model for the SecSIP tool that we have 
developed to prevent the exploit of existing vulnerabilities of SIP protocol implementations. This tool uses a 
language called VeTo to specify these preventions. We found that authoring these specifications using a 
plain text file could be suitable when the number of vulnerabilities is small.  However,  dealing with an 
important number of prevention specifications, a file-based configuration becomes error prone and hard to 
maintain. Therefore, we have constructed an XML based model of these specifications. Then, this model has 
been easily translated to the YANG data modeling language. We have used the resulting YANG model in the 
YencaP framework to configure SecSIP. 
Currently, our model only focuses on the configuration data. In a future work, we have to improve our 
YANG model to integrate the state data to expose SecSIP internal states like: VeTo variables values, fired 
rules and active dialogs. 

